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“The Community
Reinvestment Act
has helped
revitalize communities and

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has helped to revitalize low- and moderateincome communities and provided expanded opportunities for low- and moderateincome households. Recent regulatory steps aimed at alleviating burdens on banks and
thrifts are unwarranted, and may diminish small business lending as well as community
development investments and services. This policy brief explains the rationale for CRA,
demonstrates its effectiveness, and argues that the recent regulatory proposals should be
withdrawn or significantly modified.

Introduction

I

moderate-income

n 2004, two of the four federal banking regulatory agencies pulled out of a joint CRA rulemaking process. First the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) made a unilateral
announcement that the agency was going to curtail CRA examinations for nearly 90 percent of thrifts that it regulates, treating those institutions holding less than $1 billion in
assets as “small,” and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed a similar
rule for banks that it regulates.2 The Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency initially balked at this move.3 A few months later, OTS proposed to let any savings and loan, regardless of size, opt out of the investment and service tests under CRA.4 Then,
in February 2005, the Fed, the OCC, and the FDIC all agreed to raise the small bank threshold
to $1 billion but added a new “community development test” for institutions with between $250
million and $1 billion in assets.5
At bottom, debate over these changes revolves around competing views of the underlying purposes of CRA, as well as its costs and benefits. This brief thus explores the background and
operation of CRA, then demonstrates that CRA has helped low- and moderate-income households at low cost, and finally examines the current policy debate and provides policy
recommendations.

households.”

Background on CRA

provided
expanded opportunities for
low- and

T

he Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) encourages federally insured banks
and thrifts to meet the credit needs of the communities that they serve, including lowand moderate-income areas, consistent with safe and sound banking practices. Federal
banking agencies examine banks periodically on their CRA performance and rate the
institutions. Regulators consider a bank’s CRA record in determining whether to approve that
institution’s application for mergers with, or acquisitions of, other depository institutions. Banks
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and thrifts must have a satisfactory CRA record if they, or their holding companies, are to engage
in newly authorized financial activities, such as certain insurance and securities functions.
Changes to CRA regulations issued in 1995 focused evaluations on objective performance
measures rather than previously used process-oriented factors.6 These regulations require large
banks and thrifts to disclose information about their small-business, small-farm, and community-development lending. The regulations provide for tailored examinations of large banks,
small banks, and wholesale or limited-purpose institutions that more closely align with the business strategies of each institution type. Large banks are evaluated on a three-part test of their
lending, investments, and services, while small banks undergo a streamlined review of lending.
For large banks, the lending test accounts for 50 percent of the bank’s CRA rating and evaluates its performance in home mortgage, small-business, small-farm, and
community-development lending. Examiners consider the number and amount of loans to lowand moderate-income borrowers and areas, and “innovative or flexible lending practices.” Under
the investment test, which accounts for 25 percent of the bank’s CRA grade, the agency evaluates the dollar amount of the bank’s investments, investment innovation, and its responsiveness
to community needs. Under the service test, which makes up the remaining 25 percent of the
bank’s evaluation, the agency analyzes “the availability and effectiveness of a bank’s systems for
delivering retail banking services and the extent and innovativeness of its community development services.” The agency assesses an institution’s record under these tests in light of the
“performance context” in which the institution is operating, including economic and market
factors; the bank’s capacities, constraints, and business plans; and “the performance of similarly
situated lenders.”
Since enactment, CRA has been, and remains today, the subject of extensive debate. Many
legal scholars vigorously question the theoretical and empirical claims that motivated CRA, and
many also advocate eliminating the law.7 These critics argue that CRA is trying to address a
nonexistent problem, and that even if intervention is warranted, CRA is an inappropriate tool.
Many critics also suggested that CRA was having little, if any, positive effect, and at a high cost.
However, a forthcoming article systematically rebuts these prior criticisms of CRA and lays a
solid theoretical and empirical foundation for the act.8 Those findings are summarized here.

CRA Reasonably Addresses Market Failures in Low-Income Communities

A

t its core, CRA helps to overcome market failures in low-income communities. By
fostering competition among banks in serving low-income areas, CRA generates
larger volumes of lending from diverse sources, and adds liquidity to the market,
decreasing the risk of each bank’s loan. Encouraged by the law, banks and thrifts have
developed expertise in serving low-income communities, and they have created innovative products that meet the credit needs of these areas with manageable risks.
These market innovations have taken several forms. Banks and thrifts have engaged in special marketing programs to targeted communities; experimented with more flexible underwriting
and servicing techniques to serve a broader range of households, and funded credit counseling
for borrowers. Many larger institutions have developed specialized units that focus on the needs
of low- and moderate-income communities. Others have formed partnerships with communitybased organizations and community development financial institutions (CDFIs). CDFIs provide
local expertise and financial education, and assume portions of risk that banks do not want to
bear. Spurred in part by the CRA investment test, banks have invested in CDFIs in record numbers, strengthening their ability to serve low-income markets.
CRA also facilitates coordination among banks to reduce information costs. Because the law
requires all insured depositories to lend in their communities, it reduces “free rider” problems.
It has spurred the development of multi-bank community development corporations and loan
consortia to serve low- and moderate-income communities more effectively. Moreover, banks
get CRA consideration for both originating and purchasing loans, creating a trading system.
Institutions can also get credit under the CRA investment test for purchasing loan securities.
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The development of this secondary market has increased liquidity and transparency.
A positive lending cycle has thus begun in many communities once ignored by mainstream
lenders. Under CRA, lenders know that other banks will be making loans to a community,
reducing all institutions’ liquidity risk, speeding the gathering and dissemination of information,
and producing positive information externalities. Experience suggests that increased lending to
low-income communities has occurred and has not led to the kind or the extent of unprofitable,
excessively risky activity predicted by critics.
Studies have found evidence that CRA improved access to home mortgage credit for lowincome borrowers during the 1990s, as CRA regulatory intensity increased.9 Research by
Brookings and Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies found that, between 1993 and 1999,
depository institutions covered by the CRA and their affiliates made over $800 billion in home
mortgage, small business, and community development loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers and communities.10 The number of CRA-eligible mortgage loans increased by 39 percent
between 1993 and 1998, while other loans increased by only 17 percent. Even excluding affiliates, banks increased their lending to low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas by 10
percent over this period, compared with no growth at all for these lenders in their other markets. As a result, the share of all mortgage lending by CRA-covered institutions and their
affiliates directed to these borrowers and areas increased from 25 to 28 percent.
A series of factors beyond CRA contributed to these gains. Strong economic growth and low
inflation during the 1990s led to rapid income growth, low unemployment rates, and low real
interest rates. Innovation helped drive down the costs of lending. Consolidation in the financial
services sector enhanced competition among national players with economies of scale and
scope. And other laws—such as fair lending and secondary mortgage market regulations—operated in intensified ways during this period.
Controlling for the effects of these factors, however, CRA lenders increased their CRA-eligible home purchase lending faster than those not regulated by CRA from 1993 to 1999.11 The
Joint Center concluded: “CRA-regulated lenders originate a higher proportion of loans to lowerincome people and communities than they would if CRA did not exist.”12 By one estimate, the
Joint Center found that CRA’s effect on increasing home mortgage lending to low-income borrowers was equivalent to a 1.3 percentage point decrease in unemployment. Another study
found that CRA boosts the number of small businesses that can access credit by four to six percent, increasing payrolls and reducing bankruptcies—without crowding out other financing
available to small businesses or adversely affecting bank profitability or loan performance.13 In
sum, recent evidence shows that CRA provides important benefits to low-income communities.
Critics of CRA assert that it leads to unprofitable lending. But the weight of evidence suggests otherwise. In a Federal Reserve Board survey of CRA-covered institutions, most responded
that CRA lending was profitable or marginally profitable, and not overly risky.14 Pushing further
into low-income markets has not weakened banks’ profitability and soundness. In the small
“special programs” that serve as banks’ CRA laboratories, most institutions reported a net
charge-off rate of zero for loans made under these programs.

“At its core, the
Community
Reinvestment
Act helps to
overcome market failures in
low-income
communities.”

Current Policy Debate and Recommendations

M

uch of the current debate focuses not on the profitability of CRA lending, but on
banks’ and thrifts’ costs for complying with CRA regulations. Yet reforms put into
place in 1995 reduced compliance costs for all banks and streamlined CRA regulations even further for the smallest institutions. In 2002, the Independent
Community Bankers of America surveyed its membership about the cost of CRA regulation.15
Although the study is designed to highlight the high compliance costs of CRA, the data
reported in the study suggest otherwise. The mean employee cost for CRA compliance was
$84,445 per year for small banks (average assets of $216 million) and about $30,000 more per
year for larger “community” banks (average assets of $666 million). Average CRA employee
costs as a percentage of assets were thus negligible—0.017 percent for larger “community”
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banks, and 0.039 percent for small banks.
Under the regulatory agencies’ new plans, banks and thrifts with less than $1 billion in assets
would be considered “small” for purposes of CRA, and thus exempt from the investment and
services tests applicable to large banks, exempt from small business loan data disclosure, and
subject to a streamlined lending test. Even banks and thrifts that are part of mammoth holding
companies would be considered small, as long as the bank or thrift itself—not the holding company—held less than $1 billion in assets. By contrast, under current law, banks and thrifts are
considered small if they have assets of $250 million or less and are independent, or are part of a
holding company with under $1 billion in bank and thrift assets.
This section first discusses the reasons for maintaining CRA’s basic framework. Next, it
explains why proposals to raise the small bank threshold, and the OTS proposal abandoning the
investment and service tests, are ill-conceived. Finally, it comments on the proposal by the Federal Reserve Board, OCC, and the FDIC to add a “community development” test for the
institutions that would be considered “intermediate small banks.” The analysis leads to four policy recommendations regarding the regulators’ recent proposals.
1. Maintain CRA’s Basic Framework
The CRA regulations have worked exceedingly well in expanding access to credit—far more so
than the authors of the 1995 revisions could have expected. The Fed’s study suggests that this
significant expansion of credit has come at a relatively modest cost, if any, in terms of performance and profitability. Moreover, the costs to banks, and to the agencies, of changing the
regulations could be high.16 It has taken quite some time for banks and the agencies to work
through complicated interpretive issues, operational and information system problems, and the
training of bank employees and agency examination staff. Community-based organizations,
state and local governments, and other bank partners have organized community development
activities in response, to some degree, to the current structure of CRA. New regulations might
lead to high transition costs. It would be one thing if the changes led to significant improvements, but as discussed below, the proposals actually go in the wrong direction.
2. Retain the Current Definition of Small Banks
Under the agencies’ plans, banks and thrifts with less than $1 billion in assets, regardless of the
size of their holding company or affiliates, would be considered “small” for purposes of CRA.
The rules would exempt nearly 94 percent of all-FDIC insured depositories from the full-scope
review.17 In effect, these institutions would no longer be required to record or make public data
on small business lending, and would no longer be judged under the investment or retail services tests for CRA.
Lending has rightly been the focus of a statute aimed at the “credit needs” of communities,
but investment and services play critical roles as well in meeting credit needs and are thus
appropriately evaluated under CRA. Investments help build local financial and community
infrastructure, while stabilizing and broadening the economic base of low- and moderateincome communities. Investments also help expand access to credit by enhancing the capacity
of specialized local lenders such as Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) to
provide credit. By stabilizing a local community with direct investment, banks also enable loans
to be made in the community in a more safe and sound manner.
The importance of services to the provision of credit has been less well understood in the
past, but research shows that services play a critical role in expanding access to credit.18 Access
to an appropriate bank account for most low-income “unbanked” individuals could mean the
opportunity for lower transaction costs, greater consumer protection, better access to loans, and
increased savings as a cushion against financial emergency and as a predicate for borrowing.
With respect to the asset threshold, the agencies presented no evidence that banks between
$250 and $1 billion faced special burdens from the full-scope review. The ICBA study
described above, upon which some commentators on the rule relied, provides little justification
for an exemption for full scope review for these institutions. If particular burdens do exist, it
would be better to deal with them through modifications of the investment and services tests,
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rather than eliminate the tests for those firms entirely.
Moreover, it makes little sense to eliminate the investment and services tests for this particular class of institutions. Regulators already have the authority to be flexible on the investment
test.19 For example, to broaden investment options for smaller firms, regulators may count outof-area investments, not just local ones. As for the service test, small institutions often have a
comparative advantage in providing retail services tailored to their local communities. These
services are often vital to low- and moderate-income households, partly because such services
are gateways to access to credit. Because there is little justification for the current exemption of
small banks from the service test, it seems all the more ill-advised to expand the category of
institutions not subject to the test.
Smaller banks may be more important to small business lending, too, since smaller institutions often have a comparative advantage relative to large banks in relationship lending to small
businesses.20 When large banks merge, they often lose market share in small business loans that
instead are offered by local players. For these local institutions, geographic distance still matters.21 Most small businesses rely on lenders with a local presence for credit.22 This is consistent
with a theory of informational advantage for local creditors in assessing highly opaque small
business assets and other data.23 Thus, it makes little sense to avoid collecting small business
data and evaluating all institutions, including small banks and the new “intermediate small
banks,” on their small-business-lending performance.
Perhaps most problematic is the proposal to ignore the asset size of the holding company
when determining whether to consider a bank “small” for purposes of CRA. First, banks within
holding companies are less in need of regulatory “burden relief” than similarly-sized independent institutions. Holding companies provide scale economies to their subsidiaries in complying
with bank regulations.24 Banks that are part of holding companies face lower regulatory burdens
from the same regulation than their non-affiliated counterparts of similar size. Thus, affiliation
should generally be weighed, not ignored, in determining tradeoffs between regulatory burdens
and benefits.
Second, banks that are part of holding companies have available to them the range of expertise of the holding company, which is useful for developing programs to meet community needs
under CRA. The holding company is effectively part of the bank’s performance context. Along
with its subsidiaries, it can offer a range of services to the bank in helping the bank meet its
CRA performance goals, such as innovative loan products, securitization, or expertise in investments. These affiliates do affect a bank’s CRA performance, and banks in larger holding
companies should be assessed using the CRA test for large retail institutions, which effectively
takes account of the expertise and resources of the parent institution.
Third, affiliate activity is critical to understanding the performance of a bank under CRA.
Regulations already provide that evidence of illegal credit practices, whether within the depository institution or its affiliate (regardless of whether the bank opted to include the affiliate in
the examination) affects an institution’s CRA rating. Moreover, regulators now give CRA consideration for “promoting” borrowers from the subprime to the prime market. The effectiveness
of this approach depends on adequate supervision of the relationship between the bank and its
affiliates to assess whether borrowers with good credit history are “upstreamed” from subprime
affiliates and offered prime products, or conversely are steered to higher-cost subprime products. For these reasons, affiliates should not be ignored when computing the size of the
institution for purposes of determining the appropriate kind of CRA examination.

“The Community
Reinvestment
Act is working
for America’s
communities.
Now is not the
time to cut it
back.”

3. Withdraw the OTS Plan to Eliminate the Investment and Service Tests
The OTS plan to permit all institutions, regardless of size, to avoid the investment and service
tests is also deeply misguided. The OTS plan essentially makes the investment and services test
optional for all institutions, without any requirement similar to the existing “strategic plan”
option that provides for input from the public and approval by the regulators in assessing the
institution’s proposed method for evaluating its performance. As discussed at the outset, the
lending test is central to a determination of whether an institution is meeting the credit needs
of the community. The investment and service tests, however, also play critical roles. Invest-
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ments help to stabilize communities and build local institutions that help banks and thrifts to
expand access to credit. Services tailored to low- and moderate-income consumers and communities—including access to bank accounts—are the critical first steps toward their gaining the
opportunity to access credit. Both the investment and the service tests are critical to the future
of CRA and should be retained.
4. Support the Agency Proposals to add a Community Development Test
While it remains preferable to maintain the current approach for these “intermediate small
banks” (with assets from $250 million to $1 billion), rather than creating a new structure, the
proposed “community development test” does reduce some of the harm that will be caused by
adopting the OTS position, which simply removes such institutions from full-scope CRA review.
Under the community development test, such banks would be evaluated on their community
development lending, investment and services as a whole, in lieu of separate investment and
services tests. Community development services would include retail services benefiting lowand moderate-income households. An intermediate small bank could not achieve an overall
CRA rating of satisfactory unless both its lending performance and its record under the community development test were found to be satisfactory.
Because a bank could not achieve a satisfactory rating overall without achieving a satisfactory
rating on the proposed community development test, the test is likely to continue to give these
intermediate small banks an incentive to provide a mix of community development lending,
investment and services to lower-income communities and households. These institutions may,
however, move away from providing investments or services as a result of dropping the individual tests, and many smaller communities lack large banks that could fill the void. Moreover,
small business lending data would no longer be recorded or made public, which might significantly decrease incentives for these institutions to reach further into low- and moderate-income
communities to improve their small business lending performance. Thus, any community development test should explicitly include measures of small business lending performance.

Conclusion

C

RA is working for America’s communities. Now is not the time to cut it back. The
agencies’ recent proposals to increase the small bank threshold, and the OTS plan to
make the investment and services tests effectively optional, should be withdrawn. If
the small bank threshold is increased, it is critical for the agencies to continue to measure community development lending, investment, and services and to maintain the small
business lending data component of the CRA regulations for these banks and thrifts. In that
way, CRA can continue to help grow small businesses and strengthen communities in the years
ahead.
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